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Charitable Trusts And Legislation T o Make Them  Valid
The basic premise of this paper is that charitable trusts benefit a 
country. Therefore legislation should be passed to cut away the under­
growth of 1 SO years or technical decisions and remove the peril of in­
validity to which charitable trusts todav are constantly exposed.
The law looks with favour on charitable trusts —  at least the 
judges sav so. The origin of this rule lies probably in medieval law 
when persons gave a tenth of their income to the church. Today, 
while religious groups still receive a lar^e proportion of charitable gifts, 
the conception of charity is broader. I feel that one of the strongest 
arguments in favour of charitable trusts is that they can carrv out pro­
jects beneficial to the community which no government would dare to 
earn out. They can experiment, lead the way, as the Carnegie and 
Rockefeller Foundations have done. Thev can support unpopular or 
controversial ideas as the Ford Fund for the Republic or tne various 
Temperance trusts do. Thev have much greater freedom than govern­
ments and can stimulate the life of a country as well as alleviate suffer­
ing and aid merit.
Because charitable trusts arc favoured bv the law, they have been 
given two great concessions.
Firstlv, provided that the words which crcate them come within 
the legal definition of charity, they will create a valid trust even though 
the words used are so vague and uncertain that they would not ordin­
arily create a valid trust —  e.g. the words “a trust for religious pur­
poses" create a valid charitable trust although “religious” may mean 
anv one of a large number of things. On the other hand the words “a 
trust for benevolent purposes” create no trust at all. The word “bene­
volent” does not fall within the legal definition of charity and it is too 
vague and uncertain to be recognized by a court unless it does.
Secondly, charitable trusts are relieved in part from the operation 
of the Rule against Perpetuities. They must, as is normal, vest within 
the perpetuity period, but the capital of the charity may be preserved 
forever and the income only used, and a gift over from one cnarity to 
another after the perpetuity period is valid.
The problem always has been — and remains today —  what is a 
charity? No statute has laid down a definition but from early times 
the Courts of Equity referred as a guide to the preamble to a statute of 
43 Elizabeth I., Chapter 4., which set out various purposes considered 
in those days to be charitable —  e.g. the relief of poverty, education of 
orphans, support of schools —  ana repair of bridges and maintenance 
of houses or correction.
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Then in 1805, Lord Eldon, in his successful attempt to inflict the 
doctrine of strict precedent on equity, decided in the case of Morice v. 
D urham ,1 that a bequest to objects of “benevolence and liberality” was 
bad because of uncertainty. Tnat case is still quoted today as a leading 
authority. The next landmark is PemseVs Case,.2 where Lord Macnagh- 
ten said that charity in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions—  
trusts for the relief of poverty, for the advancement of religion, for the 
advancement of education, and for other purposes beneficial to the 
community. Surely that was a wide and sound definition. Except in 
trusts for the relief of povertv, the group to be benefited must be mem­
bers of the public in general; e.g. they cannot be employees of a com­
pany. In 1944, however, in the Chicnester case3 (better known as the 
Diplock case) the House of Lords held that a trust for charitable or ben- 
volent objects was invalid as the trust monies might be applied for cer­
tain benevolent purposes which were not charitable and were too un­
certain. This decision was followed in 1955 by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in a New Brunswick case Brewer v. McCauley.* In the Chiches­
ter case the intestacy created by the House of Lords, it is reported made 
a third cousin of the testator over a million dollars richer and also cost 
his executors $250,000 personally because they had distributed his estate 
to charities before the action began.
The law of charities is full of such decisions. A gift to a vicar of a 
church for such objects connected with the church as he shall see fit 
is charitable/?*? Bain,5 a gift to a vicar for parish work is not charitable, 
because it might be used for non-charitable parish purposes.8
A gift for the benefit of W elsh people in London by creating a 
centre to promote their moral, social, spiritual and educational welfare 
is bad for the same reason.7
A gift for the religious, moral, social and physical improvement of 
a community is bad. It might be used for non-cliaritable purposes.8
Even a gift —  for charitable purposes only, the persons to benefit 
being employees of the Canada Life Insurance Co. —  was held by the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to be bad.® The gift lacked 
the element of public benefit necessary and was not restricted to the 
relief of poverty. The same principle was applied in Oppenheim v. 
T obacco Securities Trust10 when a trust for tne education of children 
of employees of a Company employing more than 100,000 persons was 
held invalid.
1. (18551 10 Ves. Ju n . 522; 32 E .R . 947.
2. The C om m issioners for Special Purposes of the In com e T a x  v. Pem sel, [1891] 
A C. 531.
3. C hichester D iocesan Fan d  and B oard  of F in an ce  v. Sim pson, [1944] A .C . 341.
4. 119551 1 D .L.R . 415.
5. 11930] 1 Ch. 224.
6. Farley  ▼. W estm inster B an k . [1939] A C . 430.
7. W illiam s’ T rustees ▼. I. R. C ., [1947] A .C . 447.
8. I. R. C. v. Baddeley, [1955] A C . 572.
9. B ak er v. N ational T ru st. [1955] A  C. 627.
10. [1951] A .C . 297.
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The courts are not becoming more broadminded in their approach 
to charities as the above recent cases show. Thev are becoming nar­
rower, more bound by precedent, less inclined to look at the intention 
of the testator. W ho can doubt that in all the above cases the testator 
intended charitable gifts? He did not intend to die intestate. He wish­
ed the purposes for which he left his money to be carried out as far as 
legally possible.
I shudder to think how many invalid charitable trusts are probably 
being administered in New Brunswick today. That makes the problem 
pressing. W hat can be done?
The courts could have dealt with the problem realistically by hold­
ing that, where trusts were set up which included in their objects some 
which were not charitable, the objects would be limited to the legally 
charitable ones. The courts have power to direct a scheme, when ap­
plying the cy pres doctrine, that is, to approve specifically the objects 
to which trust monies are applied. Thev could have directed a scheme 
in other cases as well. They did not. They cannot do so now as they 
are caught in the web of precedent. Only the legislature can correct 
the present situation.
Several jurisdictions have passed legislation for this purpose. In 
England the Charitable Trusts (Validation) Act 1954 validates disposi­
tions of property for objects not exclusively charitable which took ef­
fect before December 16, 1952. The objects are restricted to the charit­
able objects. This Act is useful to protect charitable trusts at present 
being administered, but does not extend any protection to trusts set up 
after the date of the Act. For some strange reason Parliament must 
have thought that no trust set up in the future would clash with the 
technical rules of charitable trusts.
Victoria and South Wales in Australia, and New Zealand, have 
enacted similar legislation which extends to all trusts, past and future, 
which have not been declared invalid bv a Court order. This approach, 
it is submitted, is more satisfactory. The British Columbia civil justice 
sub-section of the Canadian Bar Association recommended in its report 
in 1955 that the same legislation be enacted in British Columbia. It 
provides as follows:
“Sec. 1 (1) No trust shall be held to be invalid by reason that 
some non-charitable and invalid purposes as well as 
some charitable purposes are or could oe deemed to be 
included in any of the purposes to or for which an 
application of tne trust funds or any part thereof is by 
trust directed or allowed.
(2) Any such trust shall be construed and given effect to 
in the same manner in all respects as if no application 
of the trust funds or of any part thereof to or for any 
such non-charitable and invalid purpose had been or 
could be deemed to have been so directed or allowed.
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(3) This section shall not affect any trust which has been 
declared invalid by order of a court prior to the com­
mencement of this section.”
I hesitate to comment on the effectiveness of such an Act. Much 
would depend on the attitude of the Courts, but such an Act would 
probably render valid the trusts in cases similar to the Chichester and 
Brewer cases and perhaps even in cases similar to M orice v. Durham, 
although that is more doubtful. It would not render valid trusts such 
as those in the Baker and Ob pen heim  cases where the element of pub­
lic benefit is lacking, but pernaps such trusts should not be permitted. 
Yet there is much to be said for the proposition that trusts for the 
education of employees of a company, for example, should be made 
valid, unless there is a blood relationship between the donor and the 
donees.
Such an Act would not render valid gifts to a person by virtue of 
his office unless such office is held by the Courts to be an exclusively 
charitable one, such as a bishop.11 It would not validate the gift in 
R e Spensley, 12 where a bequest was made to the National Trust to 
provide a residence for the High Commissioner of Australia. This was 
neld bv the Court of Appeal not to be a charitable gift. W hy, even a 
bequest to the New Brunswick Barristers’ Society to use the income 
forever might not be charitable.
One cannot, however, obtain perfection, especially in a highly 
technical subject, and the Act as proposed by tne British Columbia 
sub-section has much to recommend it. It would not validate gifts 
for political purposes or for the promotion of the teaching of atheism 
if they infringed the rule against perpetuities or were uncertain. These 
gifts, say the courts, lack tne element of public benefit as do gifts to 
employees.
I would recommend that an Act be drafted similar to the New 
Zealand Act validating charitable trusts. If such an Act becomes law 
in New Brunswick we can at least hope that our courts will give ef­
fect to its spirit.
Norwood Carter
Saint John, N .B.
11. See Re R nm ball, [1955] 3 All E .R . 73.
12. (1954] 1 Ch. 233.
